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CHAPTER 5
Kenya’s ‘War on Poaching’: Militarised 
Solutions to a Militarised Problem?
Thomas J Maguire
In the last decade poaching of African elephants has surged and indus-
trial-scale trafficking emerged. Estimates suggest that over 200,000 
elephants have been slaughtered to feed the trade since 2009—a large 
proportion in East Africa.1 Between 2008 and 2015, Kenya—both, one 
of Africa’s primary remaining range states for rhino, especially elephants, 
and one of its primary trafficking hubs2 to markets in East Asia—lost 
1830 elephants out of a total population of 28,000–38,000 to poaching 
according to conservative estimates (Fig. 5.1). These losses have primar-
ily taken place in the two rangelands mostly populated by elephants in 
Kenya: the Samburu-Laikipia ecosystem in the north (around 7000, or 
18–25% of the total population); and the greater Tsavo ecosystem in the 
south (around 11,000, or 29–39%.).3 During this surge there has been 
mounting evidence of links between the Illegal Wildlife Trade (IWT) 
and transnational organised crime and corruption, contributing to grow-
ing alarm over the involvement of armed non-state actors.4 Concern has 
grown that both the challenges posed by poaching and trafficking in 
ivory and other wildlife contraband, and the counter-measures to these 
challenges have become increasingly ‘militarised’.
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2  T. MAgUIRE
Narratives aNd defiNitioNs
Public discourse surrounding the poaching of elephants and their pro-
tection is peppered with militaristic terms, including ‘war’, ‘insurgency’, 
‘armed conflict’ and a ‘battle for Africa’s elephants’.6 This has established a 
simple binary of war-by-poachers/war-on-poachers that has influenced both 
the stages of trafficking chains mostly targeted with interventions (front-line 
poaching) and the mode of such interventions (instilling wildlife ranger ser-
vices with paramilitary techniques, resources and values) (Fig 5.2).
At the most extreme end of these militarisation narratives is the widely 
spread ‘ivory-terrorism nexus’ discourse. Propagated by influential state 
figures, government agencies, NgOs, media outlets and researchers 
alike, this asserts that the practices of poaching and ivory trafficking and 
terrorism feed into each other, consequently labelling poachers terror-
ists.7 Deftly tapping two hot-button issues, the image of terrorists deci-
mating iconic land mammals elicits strong reactions. Three ‘terrorist’ 
groups are frequently cited as major drivers and beneficiaries from ivory 
in particular, either through engaging directly in poaching or acting as 
trafficking middlemen: the Lord’s Resistance Army and Janjaweed in 
Central Africa, and Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya.
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Fig. 5.1 Estimates for Elephants poached in Kenya, 2008–20155 
(Source KWS)
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5 KENYA’S ‘WAR ON POACHINg’: MILITARISED SOLUTIONS …  3
Yet recent research has demonstrated that the narrative of such a 
prominent Al-Shabaab role in East Africa has been significantly exag-
gerated.8 Ensuring accurate assessments of the nature of the challenges 
posed by poaching and trafficking is crucial, for it shapes the most appro-
priate counter-measures. The Al-Shabaab/ivory-terrorism nexus nar-
rative, like broader war-by-poachers discourses, may encourage (and 
arguably already has) a bias towards front-line militarised responses and 
away from parallel priority areas, like front-line community engagement, 
criminal investigations into trafficking higher up the ivory value chain, 
and anti-corruption drives.9
Militarisation is not only articulated in a terrorism-ivory nexus con-
text. It is more regularly deployed to describe a growing amplitude, vari-
ety and sophistication of the use of force by actors on both sides of the 
issue. It typically conjures images of heavily armed poachers engaging 
in running battles with outgunned but increasingly ‘tooled up’ wildlife 
rangers. Researchers have criticised war narratives as being used to jus-
tify highly repressive and coercive responses to poaching, with potential 
knock-on effects for local communities caught in the figurative and real 
cross-fire.10
However, militarisation constitutes only one dynamic in the current 
poaching and trafficking crisis. In isolation, it provides a crude under-
standing of the challenges associated with poaching networks and the 
counter-measures that have been deployed in response. A more nuanced 
appreciation must address the links between poaching and wider forms 
of criminality, the deployment of intelligence systems, and the develop-
ment of community-based natural resource management. This chapter 
addresses these wider, linked phenomena in the context of debates over 
militarisation in Kenya.
PoachiNg aNd ivory traffickiNg iN keNya: a Militarised 
threat?
It is important to assess who is doing the poaching in Kenya, why and 
whether they constitute a militarised threat in terms of their aims, organ-
isation, methods, drivers and impact. To provide a more relative and 
contextual understanding, poaching should be compared with other 
forms of violence and criminality in Kenya. This helps determine whether 
the toolbox of militarised counter-insurgency responses that often comes 
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4  T. MAgUIRE
with ‘poaching-as-insurgency’ narratives is appropriate or effective for 
reducing the illegal ivory trade in Kenya.
Aims and Organisation
Poaching gangs represent armed non-state actors that engage in several 
tactics similar to guerrillas (such as violent harassment and surprise of 
their targets). However, the aims and organisation of poaching and ivory 
trafficking in Kenya as a whole do not represent a military movement or 
insurgency as classically conceived, despite what a small number of civil 
society actors in Kenya have argued.11 A commonly referenced definition 
of ‘insurgency’ originates from the 2007 American Counterinsurgency 
Field Manual FM 3–24:
an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted govern-
ment through the use of subversion and armed conflict…[in other words] 
an organized protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the 
control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or 
other political authority while increasing insurgent control.12
This definition is by no means definitive, for there remains much debate 
regarding what constitutes insurgency and counter-insurgency that go 
beyond ultimate political goals and apparatus.13 Nevertheless, this sets 
out several fundamental tenets common to a number of definitions 
and absent to poaching in Kenya. The actors involved are not striking 
at or seeking to overthrow a defined ‘enemy’ (for example, the Kenyan 
state) or to increase their territorial control. Nor does poaching repre-
sent a common over-arching strategy for achieving these goals or a tactic 
of warfare, that is, a tool for pursuing a broader war, unlike equivalent 
organised criminality in the war economies of countries like Afghanistan, 
Columbia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Nor do these 
actors have a central organising—let alone political—apparatus estab-
lished to coordinate the achievement of such goals.14
Instead, the initial stages in the Kenyan ivory trade’s value chain of 
poaching and ‘consolidation’ of tusks involve relatively disaggregated 
networks. Local organised crime groups (OCgs) in towns such as Isiolo 
and Nanyuki around Samburu-Laikipia and Voi and garsen around 
Tsavo have received contracts from a small number of more senior crimi-
nal ‘middlemen’ buyers in Kenya. These contracts mitigate the buyers’ 
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5 KENYA’S ‘WAR ON POACHINg’: MILITARISED SOLUTIONS …  5
risk and stipulate ivory quotas. Buyers use such stipulations to fulfil their 
own contractual obligations to East Asian transnational crime syndicates. 
Middlemen containerise consolidated ivory for international travel out 
of Nairobi and Mombasa and at other points for export from Tanzania, 
Uganda and the DRC. Local OCgs source ivory through a combination 
of hiring members of local communities around Kenya’s rangelands15 to 
form poaching gangs, ad hoc purchases from independent local poach-
ing gangs, and sending their own gang members into rangelands to 
poach. Kenya’s ivory trade, from poaching upwards, is loosely organised 
and enables several levels of criminal gangs and corrupt businessmen and 
politicians to make large profits, utilised both for personal benefit and to 
sustain other criminal activities.16
The underlying forces behind poaching and ivory trafficking are not 
focused on subverting state authority through military means. Instead, 
key drivers broadly constitute the endemic corruption of Kenyan politics, 
the ethnically fragmented nature of the Kenyan polity and society, high 
levels of socioeconomic marginalisation and the prevalence of small arms. 
An analysis of the methods, drivers and impacts of poaching further elu-
cidates this point.
Fig. 5.2 East African Elephant Range (2012) (Source International Union for 
the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Elephant Survey Map, accessible at: http://
www.elephantdatabase.org)
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6  T. MAgUIRE
Methods
Advocates of the militarisation narrative argue that poaching gangs 
have become increasingly armed in both quantity and quality of small 
arms, making them more deadly. This proliferation of weapons—not a 
phenomenon exclusive to poaching—was classed as ‘one of Kenya’s 
most pressing security challenges’ by a 2014 Born Free Foundation 
and C4ADS report.17 A 2012 assessment by the Small Arms Survey 
estimated 530,000–680,000 guns—from AK-47s to carbines like 
M-16s—lie in Kenyan civilian hands, clustered among northern pasto-
ralist communities bordering Samburu-Laikipia and in the East border-
ing Somalia.18 Many are smuggled across Kenya’s porous borders with 
Uganda and the conflict-ridden Somalia and South Sudan. g-3 rifles 
and ammunition from Kenyan Police and Army stocks have also been 
used for the killing of policemen, firefights with wildlife rangers, and the 
poaching of elephants. This leakage reflects poor security and corrup-
tion within parts of Kenya’s security sector.19 Arms and ammunition have 
periodically gone missing from the British Army Training Unit in Kenya 
(BATUK) at Nanyuki, 200 km north of Nairobi bordering Samburu-
Laikipia.20 Kenya Police Service crime reports detailing firearm sei-
zures add to this picture of large numbers of small arms available in and 
around Kenya’s elephant rangelands and poaching hotspots (Rift Valley, 
Eastern and Coast).21
A 2012 Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) survey on methods of elephant 
poaching further supports this image of easily available small arms in the 
North. In Samburu-Laikipia, 85% of elephants poached were killed by 
gunshots compared to 34% in Tsavo (arrows, poison and other means 
comprised the other methods). Compared to 74% and 17% respec-
tively across the period of 2000–2010, this survey additionally suggests 
an increase in poachers’ use of light arms.22 From 2012–2014, how-
ever, annual KWS reports highlight mixed trends in dominant poach-
ing methods. While they chart a continuing proliferation of light and 
more ‘sophisticated’ weapons (for example, with affixed scopes and 
night-vision equipment), they also underscore a concurrent pattern of 
quieter, cheaper and simpler methods such as arrows, traps and poison, 
favoured in order to avoid drawing the attention of patrolling rang-
ers.23 Consequently, while small arms have long been widely available to 
poaching gangs in Kenya, poaching methods have not become uniformly 
more militarised.
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Drivers and Impacts
The degree of militarisation of poaching, and the scale of the problem 
this presents, can be further understood in the context of broader vio-
lence and conflict in Kenya. This broader issue forms both a driver of 
poaching, and a counterpoint for assessing its violent impacts beyond 
the immediate deaths of wildlife. These wider impacts, including wildlife 
ranger casualties, are often highlighted by advocates of the ‘poaching-as-
war’ narrative as indicators of the security challenge posed by poaching 
and consequent forceful responses required.24
The casualties suffered by the Kenyan authorities at the hands of 
poachers are much lower than those in other African range states. 
Between 2007 and 2014, according to KWS publicly released figures, 17 
rangers lost their lives to poachers. The majority—seven—died in 2010, 
after which the numbers have fallen to an average of two per annum. 
This pales in comparison to circa 150 ranger deaths reported since 2006 
in the DRC’s Virunga National Park alone.25 Richard Vigne, head of 
Kenya’s Ol Pejeta Conservancy in Laikipia County, contrasted this more 
violent situation in Central Africa to that in Kenya, noting that although 
poaching remains a danger to rangers, it is being conducted more sur-
reptitiously, by smaller gangs, and targeting fewer animals at a time.26
Ranger death rate figures are also low when compared to casual-
ties suffered by Kenyan authorities from inter-communal conflict and 
cattle-raiding in northern Kenya, and attacks by Al-Shabaab and affili-
ated Islamist violent extremists in the North-East, Coast and Nairobi. 
In one attack in May 2015, for example, suspected Al-Shabaab or 
Al-Shabaab-affiliated militants killed 25 Kenyan police officers in a patrol 
convoy in garissa County in the North-East.27 Inter-communal vio-
lence has proved equally if not more deadly.28 In a single engagement 
in November 2012, cattle rustlers killed 40 police officers in Samburu. 
In late 2014 over 20 police officers were killed in two linked attacks in 
Turkana and Baringo counties, north-west Kenya, by Pokot militants 
fighting against Turkana communities in another cattle-rustling dis-
pute.29
Many of the areas surrounding the Samburu-Laikipia rangelands 
suffer from inter-communal pastoralist violence over resource rights. 
Facilitated by the availability of light arms in the region, many turn to 
poaching during lean periods for pastoralists.30 Between 15 January 
1997 and 5 May 2016, 5082 documented incidents of political, ethnic, 
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8  T. MAgUIRE
religious, socioeconomic, environmental and criminal violence at the 
hands of state and non-state actors resulted in 8912 reported fatalities.31 
5034 of these fatalities, or 57%, occurred since the start of 2007, when 
the present wave of poaching began to swell in Kenya.32
The majority of these conflict incidents and fatalities, alongside the 
highest number of small arms seizures, have occurred in the provinces 
surrounding Kenya’s main elephant rangelands (Fig. 5.3). The prolifera-
tion of freely available arms in these counties (Fig. 5.4), and consequent 
use of gunshot as the primary method of poaching, in part explains the 
stark difference in violence rates between the Samburu-Laikipia counties 
(with the exception of Tana River) and those around Tsavo (Fig. 5.5).
Poaching in Kenya should be understood not as a unique and iso-
lated phenomenon but as part of this wider violence and criminal-
ity. In June 2011 in Turkana near Kainuk, a Kenya Police Anti-Stock 
Theft Unit inspector and a KWS corporal were shot dead in a raid on 
the Lochakula security camp by more than 200 suspected cattle raiders 
from a Pokot ethnic militia.33 Similarly, in 2014 an elite community con-
servancy ranger was shot and killed in an exchange of fire with heavily 
2011 2014
PROVINCE Small Arms Ammunition Small Arms Ammunition
Nairobi 58 1,686 194 729
Rift Valley 37 264 47 345
North Eastern 36 9,196 31 1,925
Coast 27 695 28 1,036
Eastern 23 3,146 28 474
Nyanza 3 29 28 22
Central 11 81 23 52
Western 9 116 12 583
TOTAL 203 15,213 391 5,166
Fig. 5.3 Police recoveries of small arms and ammunition in Kenya (Sources 
The Kenya Police Service, ‘Annual Crime Report for the Year 2011’, p. 16; The 
Kenya Police Service, ‘Annual Crime Report 2014’, p. 7.)
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5 KENYA’S ‘WAR ON POACHINg’: MILITARISED SOLUTIONS …  9
armed cattle raiders on the edge of Sera Community Conservancy north 
of Archer’s Post.34 Field interviews in northern Kenya and an analysis 
of programming reports by NgOs in the region such as the Northern 
Rangelands Trust (NRT) have revealed what these incidents indicated: a 
close nexus between wildlife poaching, cattle rustling, road banditry, and 
inter-communal conflict, with weapons and individuals rotating between 
all four.35
Economics drives recruitment to poaching gangs from local com-
munities around Kenya’s rangelands. Following the spike in ivory 
prices since the late 2000s, local OCgs offer Kenyan poachers on aver-
age around $40–60 per kilo. given that two (on average) five kilo tusks 
from a single elephant are equivalent of several months’ wages, some 
members of these rangeland communities have turned towards poach-
ing.36 The 2014 Economic Survey of rural poverty underscores this issue 
in and around Samburu-Laikipia and Tsavo: in Turkana County 88% of 
the population lives below the official poverty line of Ksh 1562 (around 
$15) per month, in Marsabit 76%, in Samburu 71%, in Isiolo 65%, in 
Tana River 76%, in Kwale 71%, in Kitui 60% and in Taita Taveta 50%.37
These broader and comparative perspectives have implications for 
what counter-measures are appropriate, proportionate and necessary. 
Interpreting the situation in a way that requires a ‘war on poachers’ is 
both reductionist in its inherent narrow focus on poaching in isolation, 
and inflammatory in its implications for militarised responses. It is to 
these responses in Kenya that this chapter now turns.
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Fig. 5.4 Conflict in Kenya’s Provinces 1997–2016 (Source ACLED)
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10  T. MAgUIRE
Conflict
Incidents 
1997-2006
Samburu-Laikipia 
Ecosystem Counties
Conflict 
Incidents 
2007-2016
Reported 
Fatalities 
1997-2006
Reported 
Fatalities 
2007-2016
Turkana 145 129 721 723
Samburu 33 29 182 130
Baringo 16 58 21 123
Laikipia 41 58 50 80
Nakuru 110 209 224 297
Marsabit 107 75 387 250
Isiolo 60 52 105 110
Meru 15 31 5 21
Nyandarua 17 17 34 3
Nyeri 43 68 157 48
Greater Tsavo 
Ecosystem Counties
Conflict 
Incidents 1997-
2006
Conflict 
Incidents 2007-
2016
Reported 
Fatalities 1997-
2006
Reported 
Fatalities 2007-
2016
Tana River 40 53 160 216
Kwale 13 53 18 49
Kilifi 16 90 18 59
Taita-Taveta 12 44 1 6
Kitui 8 28 0 8
Makueni 5 6 10 1
Kajiado 16 34 19 39
Fig. 5.5 Violent conflict in and around the Samburu-Laikipia and Tsavo range-
lands (Source ACLED)
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arMed aNti-PoachiNg: traiNiNg aNd equiPPiNg 
for coMbat
The adoption of military approaches and values in poaching responses 
have a long history across Africa’s range states.38 Kenya is no differ-
ent. Combat patrols have been used since the 1970s–1980s poaching 
wave. Special units of the Kenya Army and Police (such as the paramili-
tary general Service Unit (gSU)) conducted these patrols before the 
KWS took the lead following its 1990 inception. Armed police units 
of the gSU and Administration Police (AP, a paramilitary security out-
fit answerable to the Office of the President) continue to be involved, 
including through a central elite inter-agency Anti-Poaching Unit 
formed in 2013.39
Like other African wildlife services, KWS rangers in the field are 
organised on military lines and deployed with military kit (from fatigues, 
to berets, to rifles). Since its founding, the KWS Law Enforcement 
Academy (LEA) at Manyani in Tsavo West National Park has run para-
military training courses alongside other specialised law enforcement 
programmes for over 1000 KWS rangers. Since the late 2000s, it has also 
acted as the centre for training increasing numbers of community rang-
ers across Kenya’s growing conservancy movement. Concurrently, since 
2011, the service has been conducting an ongoing ‘Force Modernisation 
Programme’. This has included procuring specialised security equipment, 
including drones, night-vision goggles, helicopters and satellite collars as 
well as more basic supplies like ammunition, rifles and vehicles.40
The KWS has also worked with foreign military partners to improve its 
combat tracking of poaching gangs, reinforcing its increasing paramilitary 
methods and values. The US Marine Corps has provided ranger training 
in ‘detection and prevention techniques’. This is mirrored by a concurrent 
programme by the British parachute regiment and Welsh guards, part of an 
established package of British security assistance dating back to Kenyan inde-
pendence. Run through the BATUK at Nanyuki, this paramilitary training 
for 100 KWS law enforcement officers actively drew on the trainers’ recent 
counter-insurgency experiences in Afghanistan. Additionally, since 2011 the 
US Embassy in Nairobi has conducted joint Rural Border Patrol courses for 
officers from the KWS, gSU and Rural Border Patrol Unit of the Kenya 
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Police, and Rapid Deployment Unit of the AP through the embassy’s post-
9/11 Anti-Terrorism Assistance Programme. Indicative of the growing 
broader functions of instruments of conservation, US officials involved con-
sidered the KWS to be an important lever for contributing to rural ‘stabil-
ity’ in Kenya given its rangers’ greater presence in remote countryside than 
other officers of the state such as the police.41
Non-state conservation entities in Samburu-Laikipia have engaged 
in similar combat-tracking capacity-building. By 2015, over 600 rang-
ers from the 28 NRT-affiliated conservancies had been trained, equipped 
and deployed across a 25,000 km2 area of land where few national parks 
or reserves exist and KWS presence is negligible. These rangers have been 
trained in both wildlife monitoring skills and paramilitary techniques by the 
KWS Law Enforcement Academy and three linked private security firms.42 
By 2015, nearly 200 of these rangers had been accorded Kenya Police 
Reserve (KPR) status, meaning they can carry government weapons on duty 
(Fig. 5.6).43
Fig. 5.6 Area map of Northern Rangelands trust community conservancies 
(Source NRT, http://www.nrt-kenya.org/, accessed on 29 April 2016)
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The NRT itself has developed three specialist overarching rapid 
response units explicitly intended to tackle overlapping and linked poach-
ing, road banditry, livestock theft and inter-communal conflict. Called 
‘9-1A’, ‘9-1B’ and ‘9-2’ after their radio call signs, these 12-man teams 
have KPR status and have been recruited from the three main eth-
nic groups represented amongst the community conservancies. Using 
advanced training in weapons handling and combat operations from 
one of the private security firms, 51 Degrees, deploying more modern, 
higher calibre rifles than the armed conservancy rangers, and linked 
into a 24-hour operations room in Lewa, these three elite teams sup-
port conservancy rangers when poachers or cattle rustlers are located.44 
NRT managers have sought to implement a holistic approach to inse-
curity as a whole in order to avoid the ‘balloon effect’, whereby a crack-
down on poachers merely pushes them into other forms of criminality.45 
Consequently, these elite ranger units and their community conservancy 
counterparts have a broader remit than just anti-poaching.
To better understand this paramilitary response, Kenya’s local security 
culture must be considered. As Alice Hills, an expert on policing in Africa, 
has stressed, it is crucial to place regional analyses of police and security 
forces in an African context, where such forces tend to act more as channels 
of regime power and authority than in Western states.46 Law enforcement 
and internal security have had paramilitary characteristics since the colonial 
era. Over decades this has led to a number of notable human rights viola-
tions across the country—in particular, in the North-East and Coast—and 
security ‘blowback’ from communities affected by repeated heavy-handed 
police action.47 It is unsurprising, therefore, that as the KWS and conserv-
ancy rangers added security functions to their more traditional zoological 
conservation work, paramilitary characteristics have developed in parallel.48
The ultimate value of focussing on a primarily paramilitary, combat-track-
ing intervention to the detriment of additional complementary initiatives is 
questionable. The drivers of poaching in Kenya strongly suggest that simply 
improving wildlife rangers’ armed ability to deter, capture or kill poachers 
will not have a significant long-term impact but instead maintain a low-level 
game of ‘whack-a-mole’. While local communities continue to have scarce 
socioeconomic opportunities, little buy-in towards the value of elephants 
and rhino, intractable resource-based disputes, and deep-seated distrust of 
central state security representatives, local OCgs’ high rewards for joining 
poaching gangs will mean an ongoing supply of willing poachers regardless 
of the sophistication of rangers’ combat skills.49
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Yet this paramilitary capacity building is not merely targeted at 
poaching. The KWS and community rangers are filling a vacuum of law 
enforcement and security provision created by the limited presence of 
the Kenya Police in rural areas, in particular in northern counties. This 
reflects broader issues surrounding the state capacity in countries like 
Kenya to govern, maintain law and order, provide security and, in this 
context, protect wildlife.50 These rangers, thus, have developed broader 
functions aimed at achieving stabilisation of the Kenyan countryside. As 
explored further below, this holistic approach has in fact involved more 
than merely anti-poaching combat-tracking.
iNtelligeNce aNd surveillaNce
A significant amount of training and equipping is focussed on the wider 
security functions of the KWS and community rangers beyond armed 
combat-tracking. Surveillance and intelligence systems are being devel-
oped, both through new information technologies and the utilisation 
of existing ones in new ways. This includes Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs, or drones), camera traps, thermal imaging, real-time monitor-
ing, gPS tracking, digital communications networks and big data, net-
work and pattern analysis software across Africa. The KWS and non-state 
actors like the NRT have increasingly utilised such methods to support 
combat-tracking and disruption of local OCgs running poaching gangs. 
Some consider this to be yet another indicator of the militarisation of 
conservation and counter-measures to wildlife crime.51
Military approaches, in particular based on counter-insurgency expe-
riences, are being drawn upon in deploying intelligence systems in 
Kenya. Again, however, describing this purely in terms of militarisation 
is too limited. While the integration of tactical intelligence work into 
armed ranger patrols does have many parallels with military intelligence 
approaches in combat environments, these technologies and processes 
are not inherently or uniquely ‘military’ in nature.52 They are being 
deployed in parallel in a range of non-military environments, from polic-
ing and other branches of the security sector, to research, to conserva-
tion management more generally.
The limited numbers of rangers in Kenya’s rangelands have very large 
areas to patrol, a fact which poaching gangs have historically exploited. 
As of 2014 in the Tsavo national parks, for example, 300 KWS rang-
ers covered 22,000 km2, 100 of whom had non-patrol functions.53 
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Deploying intelligence systems—such as through the KWS Intelligence 
Unit founded in 2011 with the assistance of foreign partners54—has 
helped reduce this asymmetry by increasing the chances and speed 
of detections of incursions. Yet these skills and resources can only go 
so far. Like with its combat-tracking, KWS’ investigative jurisdiction is 
restricted to official protected areas. Its operations to infiltrate, disrupt, 
prevent and arrest trafficking networks can, therefore, go no further than 
when ivory is transported out of protected areas to local OCgs in nearby 
towns. Anything beyond this is the responsibility of the Kenya Police, 
Customs, Ports Authority and Airports Authority.
These KWS limitations have also shaped the deployment of intelli-
gence capabilities outside of the protected areas. The NRT has formed 
its own intelligence capacity with British and American state and private 
support. Community rangers have been equipped with intelligence col-
lation and reporting technologies for targeting not only poachers and 
ivory traffickers but also other linked forms of criminality and violence. 
This technology feeds into software in ‘all-source’ intelligence fusion 
cells at headquarters in Lewa Conservancy. There, a small number of 
analysts manage everything from HUMINT source reports from inform-
ants in local villages, to geospatial imagery intelligence of the terrain 
over which poachers and rangers are operating, to more sensitive mobile 
phone intercepts on suspect poachers and local ivory traders obtained 
from Kenyan telecommunications companies with the support of the 
Kenya Police and National Intelligence Service.55 Conservancy rangers’ 
ethnic profiles are key in leveraging their knowledge of community pol-
itics and customs and building trust with inhabitants to gain informa-
tion on the often well-known local poachers. Trust is key in intelligence 
work for both practitioners and informants alike, and local communities 
in northern Kenya have long-standing experiences of repression by state 
security forces that have undermined such trust in ‘outside’ police and 
KWS rangers. This branch of the NRT’s work has informed investiga-
tions higher-up trafficking chains through evidence shared with the KWS 
and Police.56
Several stakeholders supporting anti-poaching in Kenya have more 
actively drawn on military experience and values when advocating the 
utility of these intelligence systems. In particular, they have encour-
aged the use of counter-insurgency military intelligence tactics, tech-
niques and procedures against poachers and low-level OCg traffickers.57 
In 2015, the KWS and the US-based NgO the International Fund for 
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Animal Welfare (IFAW) launched a new system named ‘tenBoma’, mean-
ing ‘Ten Houses’. Adapting a long-standing Kenyan community polic-
ing philosophy, tenBoma is building an intelligence fusion centre at the 
KWS regional headquarters in Voi to support operations across the Tsavo 
and Amboseli national parks through data pattern analysis of poaching. 
Like the NRT, this software draws on a range of intelligence sources, 
in particular grassroots information from within local communities.58 
In contrast to the NRT’s community development strategic approach, 
tenBoma’s stakeholders emphasise the input of American counter-insur-
gency experience, stating that ‘these same techniques have been used 
by military intelligence units to predict and prevent terror attacks in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. They can be used to predict and prevent poach-
ing.’59 IFAW’s lead project advisers, moreover, all have military intelli-
gence and Special Forces backgrounds.60 Military thinking from foreign 
conflict environments consequently suffuses the project.
New intelligence and surveillance technologies can be erroneously 
presented as a panacea to poaching. Many technologies represent signifi-
cant investments for cash-strapped conservation authorities to purchase, 
manage and train their staff to use. Those experienced in anti-poaching 
in Kenya acknowledge that, while such technology can help, they are not 
a substitute for the basics: having a sufficient density of well trained, ade-
quately equipped, well-looked-after and strongly motivated field rang-
ers.61 Nevertheless, massive amounts of data including names, phone 
numbers and routines of key individuals is often trapped at the park and 
conservancy level. Local NgOs and communities do not trust state agen-
cies with this information for fear of corruption, often with good rea-
son. Under the right circumstances they are willing to share information. 
Empowering communities and civil society organisations like the NRT to 
continue collecting intelligence under regulated conditions as a coopera-
tive partner with state authorities may continue to be the only organic 
solution to the vacuum of state service and authority in Kenya’s rural 
peripheries.62
coMMuNity PoliciNg, develoPMeNt, aNd eNgagiNg froM 
the grouNd uP
These wider intelligence approaches supporting front-line anti-poach-
ing reflect the growing consensus that armed ranger combat patrol-
ling should be combined with programmes that tackle both drivers of 
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poaching and broader instability. Through the likes of the NRT, Tsavo 
Trust, and Tsavo Conservation group, there is increasing support 
for more bottom-up community-based natural resource management 
schemes. Researchers and practitioners alike are championing this across 
Africa as a long-term solution that combines security, stabilisation, devel-
opment and conservation goals.63
The NRT’s approach focuses on promoting long-term human and 
wildlife security through local ownership and decision-making.64 This 
has fostered greater community buy-in to wildlife protection. It also rep-
resents an extension of devolved, grassroots governance and civil society-
building initiatives in Kenyan political reforms and development work 
over the past two decades. Three key inter-linked pillars of action have 
emerged from this, representing a more nuanced, holistic approach to 
counteracting poaching. First have been socioeconomic development 
programmes and land-reform initiatives. These have provided health 
clinics, schools and new channels for cattle sales to market, while pro-
moting more sustainable resource use by both conservation and different 
ethnic groups of traditional pastoralists. These programmes have both 
fomented alternative livelihoods to poaching, and reduced deteriora-
tion of rangelands and resource conflict. Second, ethnic groups, some of 
which have historically been antagonistic, have formed ‘peace teams’ and 
grazing committees in pursuit of non-violent conflict resolution. This is 
closely linked to land reform and ranger security interventions, for cattle 
rustling has been the long-term source of inter-communal mistrust.65
Third is the work of the NRT and community rangers themselves, 
who hail from a representative slice of different ethnic communities. 
Through their multi-faceted work, including mitigating stock theft, road 
banditry and inter-communal conflict, they have ‘become part commu-
nity policemen, part wildlife guardians.’66 Community policing of the 
kind being trialled across Kenya can be particularly effective in territo-
ries where violence, conflict and criminality is endemic, state capacity to 
achieve human security is weak, and trust in state agencies is low.67 This 
leads to the NRT’s conclusion that ‘conservancies have essentially taken 
over a large component of law enforcement [from the state]’.68
Elephant mortality statistics provide some, albeit limited, quantitative 
insights into the potential effects of this grounded NRT approach. Since 
the 2012 peak of 103 elephant deaths by poaching across NRT conserv-
ancies, a significant year-on-year decline has occurred, reaching 20 as of 
2015. This decline has been in line with national trends, however, the 
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rate of decline in NRT conservancies from 2012 to 2015 outstripped the 
average national rate (81% compared to 75%). Moreover, the Proportion 
of Illegally Killed Elephants (PIKE) dropped from a debilitating 81% 
in 2012 to concerning yet more sustainable levels of 43% in 2014 and 
37% in 2015.69 While several factors have likely contributed to these 
trends, NRT officials and community representatives have highlighted 
causal links between the conservancies’ benefits and this decline.70 
Nevertheless, the risk of a balloon-effect remains a concern. Between 
2012 and 2014, road banditry and stock theft incidents increased from 
15 to 24 and 42 to 71, respectively, suggesting some former or would-
be poachers are being displaced into alternative forms of criminality.71 
Moreover, in 2016 and the first half of 2017, spikes in armed violence 
have directly impacted conservancies and private ranches in Samburu-
Laikipia. Driven by a combination of endemic drought in Kenya’s north-
ern counties, ongoing intercommunal conflict and local land-use politics 
in the lead up to national elections, nomadic cattle herders have moved 
south onto conservation land and targeted property, ranchers and con-
servationists.72 This further underscores the need for holistic approaches 
to both security interventions and development programmes targeting 
the drivers of violence and criminality in Samburu-Laikipia and Kenya’s 
other rangelands.
high-level iNvestigatioNs of traffickiNg aNd orgaNised 
criMe
While programmatic responses focussing on alternatives to poaching in 
Kenya’s rangelands are increasingly supplementing militarised responses, 
there remains a vacuum of inaction higher up the country’s ivory traf-
ficking chains. Mid- and high-level organised crime bosses and corrupt 
figures who enable the trade’s scale and reach, enjoy widespread impu-
nity. While rangers’ efforts in the rangelands may stymie particular 
poaching ventures, such ‘kingpins’ are able to move into other crimi-
nal enterprises or to return to poaching in the future. As examined in 
other chapters in this book, this pattern is evident in the counter-meas-
ures taken against Somali Piracy, where low-level pirates were targeted 
through militarised means at sea, but higher-up OCg and corrupt ena-
blers in Somalia remained untouched.73 Lessons from global initiatives 
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against other forms of organised crime have been inadequately incorpo-
rated into tackling the illegal ivory trade in Kenya.74
There have been four main obstacles in investing more efforts into 
such counter-measures: (i) the weak capacity of Kenyan state agen-
cies to conduct rigorous investigations that will stand up in court; (ii) 
poor inter-agency coordination; (iii) limited international coopera-
tion between Kenyan agencies, equivalents in neighbouring countries 
like Tanzania, Western intelligence services with a local presence, and 
NgOs; and (iv) a lack of high-level political-will to tackle corruption. 
This is a problem that goes beyond the IWT to law enforcement and 
counter-terrorism in Kenya. Poor tradecraft among agencies limits their 
ability to conduct detailed interrogations, track the movements of sus-
pects, and systematically collate and analyse multi-source intelligence and 
evidence.75 Prosecutions are often poorly handled, and judges repeat-
edly fail to address wildlife crime seriously. Although some low-ranking 
organised crime figures have been jailed, it appears that cases against 
the few higher-level kingpins arrested for the first time since 2014—
such as businessmen Feisal Mohamed Ali caught in Dar es Salaam and 
Abdurahman Mohammed Sheikh in Mombasa—will drag out for years.76 
Thus, while arrest rates for poaching and wildlife trafficking in Kenya 
have been increasing since the late 2013 introduction of the Wildlife 
Conservation and Management Act, prosecution and conviction rates 
remain poor.77 This is true across many African range states.
Several initiatives have begun to address these problems. Ongoing 
capacity building of the KWS’ intelligence and investigative functions 
focuses on building cases at the early stages of the trafficking chain 
between poachers and their initial OCg buyers.78 International bodies 
such as INTERPOL, the UNODC and the World Customs Organisation 
are also working with other Kenyan stakeholder agencies to bolster 
higher-level co-operation frameworks. Plans are also developing for inter-
national inter-agency and multi-commodity (wildlife, heroin, people traf-
ficking) Transnational Organised Crime Units in Kenya and Tanzania 
that can interface with foreign partner intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies.79 These nascent initiatives, while still hampered by corruption 
and absent political-will to prosecute senior kingpins, demonstrate that 
Kenya’s response to the IWT, while still front-line heavy, is beginning to 
move away from over-reliance on militarised counter-measures.
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coNclusioN
While Kenya’s approach has been dominated by a militarised cast, to 
which the link to terror is of particular concern, there are commenda-
ble ongoing efforts by state and non-state actors alike to move towards 
a more holistic and integrated approach. It is key to supplement armed 
combat-tracking with intelligence collection and analysis from both 
grassroots and technical sources. This must be combined with com-
munity engagement programmes and the ability and will to investigate 
higher-level OCgs and corrupt figures. Integrating such counter-poach-
ing and contraband trafficking measures with initiatives to undermine 
other forms of violence and criminality, whether they be cattle rustling, 
road banditry and inter-communal violence in Kenya’s countryside or 
linked forms of organised criminal trafficking higher up, better engages 
with the aims, drivers and enablers of wildlife crime in Kenya. However, 
there remains the risk that those initiatives, on the front-line in particu-
lar, will draw too heavily on counter-insurgency experience and doctrine 
if community engagement continues to be dominated by security-based 
motivations. The broader context of widespread conflict, violence and 
prevalence of arms, and broader institutional problems associated with 
weak central states like Kenya poses a significant challenge to effective 
counter-poaching measures. Nuanced approaches that break the mould 
of traditional paramilitary responses represent the way forward.
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